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The Investment TaxCredit:n Evaluation
ABSTRACT
Since1954, the United States government has made numerous
adjustments in the taxtreatmentof corporate income with the aim
of influencing the level ani composition of fixed business investment.
The effects of these reforms, principally changes in the investment
tax credit, are evaluated using a macro—econometric model. We find
little evidence that the investment tax credit is aneffectivefiscal
policytool. Changes inthe credit have tended to destabilize the
economy,and have yielded much less stimulusper dollar of revenue
lossthan haspreviously been assumed. The crowding out of
"non—favored"investment has been sufficient to offset a large
percentage of the increase in the stock of equipment resulting from
the use of the credit. We are led to conclude that the reliance
onthe investment tax credit and otherinvestmenttax incentives
should be reduced. If a credit is to be maintained, it is of the
utmost importance that its effect on all sectors of the economy
be considered. We analyse several possible neutrality criteria,










Since 1954, the U.S. government has made numerous adjustments
in the tax treatment of corporate income with the aim of influencing
the level and composition of business activity and, more specifically,
fixed capital investment. Although it comprises less than 1OZ of
gross national product,1 private investment in nonresidential
structures and equipment is considered a crucial determinant of
the dynamic behavior of the economy. There are two important reasons
for this. First, the level of production potentially available to
the economy in any given year depends on the size of the capital
stock, which is determined by the level of investment in the years
preceding. A prolonged period during which capital investment is
depressed may greatly reduce potential output. A second reason
for concern is that investment is more volatile than other components
of output.2 Since current investments affect a firm's output
capability many years hence, expectations of future demand conditions
and interest rates may have a large impact on the level of investment
today. Because the planned purchases of investment goods may be
postponed or speeded up, the instability of these expectations implies
that the demand for such goods may be subject to swings which, through2
effects on employment, feed back through the rest of the economy.
Changes in the corporate tax structure designed to encourage
investment, generally referred to as tax Incentives, operate chiefly
by altering the profitability of given investment projects. Some
channels available for tax incentives are:
Accelerated Depreciation. Over the life of a capital good,
firms are permitted to deduct a fraction of its purchase price each
year in calculating taxable income. Such deductions, referred to
as depreciation allowances, are meant to account for the asset's
annual decline in value. A deduction scheme which accurately mirrors
this decline is referred to as "economic depreciation." To the extent
that allowances in the years immediately following the asset's
acquisition exceed its true loss in value, the depreciation schedule
is "accelerated." By increasing the degree of acceleration,
government is, in effect, making an interest—free loan to the
corporate taxpayer. The greater the loan, the more attractive the
investment.
Shortened Depreciation Lifetime. Effectively equivalent to
accelerated depreciation, measures which shorten the period over
which depreciation schedules are applied allow depreciation deducations
to be used more quickly after an asset's purchase.
Investment Tax Credit. This measure permits a diminution of
taxliabilityequal to a certain fraction of capital investment
expenditures, subject to certain restrictions concerning the type
of investment eligible and the total amount of credit claimed.3
Theeffect of the credit is to lower the real cost of capital goods
to firms, without altering the returns from such capital. This
clearly increases the rate of return on investment.
Investment Grant. Never instituted in the U.S., this measure
has been used in Great Britain and often suggested as an alternative
to the investment tax credit. It provides for a direct government
rebate to firms of a certain fraction of investment expenditures.
It therefore differs from a tax credit in that it is not restricted
to profitable enterprises with tax liabilities. This difference
may be deemed a weakness of the grant approach if government sees
the lack of current profits as indicative of inefficient operation
which should not be subsidized.
Corporate Tax Cut. Seemingly the most obvious approach to
stimulating investment expenditures, a cut in the statutory tax rate
may actually discourage new investment when it occurs in the presence
of accelerated depreciation. This anomalous result is possible
because the tax savings from such excess deductions are reduced
when the tax rate is lowered, so that the effective rate of tax paid
by the firm may rise. Because interest payments are shielded from
corporate taxation, such an outcome is more likely to occur in a
highly levered firm, where savings on taxable profits are low relative
to the scale of operation.3
A more certain disadvantage of a corporate tax cut is that
it applies to Income from all corporate assets, and so is likely
to be less cost—effective than, for example, a tax credit, which
subsidizes only new investment.
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Except for the investment grant, all of the above incentives
have been in effect for at least part of the period between 1954
and the present. As of 1954, the maximum marginal corporate tax
rate was 52%, and straight—line depreciation was essentially the
only method permitted for tax purposes. The Revenue Act of 1954
allowed firms to choose between straight—line and two other methods
of depreciation, known as sum—of—the—years digits and double—declining
balance. Both of the last two methods are more favorable to the
firm than straight—line in that they accelerate depreciation
allowances and thereby increase the present values of such allowances.
In 1962, two additional measures were enacted to further
stimulate investment. First, lifetimes allowable for depreciation
were shortened for equipment by the introduction of more liberal
guidelines. Second, and more important, was the institution by the
Revenue Act of 1962 of the investment tax credit at a rate of 7%
of equipment purchases. The credit was accompanied by an appropriate
adjustment of the depreciation base, so that only the net cost of
assets could be depreciated. This provision, known as the Long
Amendment, was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1964, making the credit
even more generous. Also included in the act was a cut in the maximum
statutory corporate tax rate from 52% to 50% in 1964 and 48% starting
in 1965. As stated above, this policy cannot be viewed with certainty
as expansionary. The corporate tax was raised again, temporarily,
by the 10% tax surcharge which took effect in 1968, raising the
statutory rate to 52.8%. All but one fourth of the surcharge was
removed in 1970, the remainder in 1971.5
By 1966, the economy was operating at unemployment rates of
under 4%, and measures were sought to restrain aggregate demand.
One of these was the suspension of the investment tax credit in
October, 1966. Although the suspension was originally to hold until
December 1967, it was removed in March, so that it was in effect
less than five months. Concurrent with the 1966 suspension was a
change in one of the depreciation options allowed for structures.
The double—declining balance method was replaced by the 150% declining
balance method. This change lessened the degree of acceleration
in depreciation allowances for structures. The credit remained in
effect until 1969, when it was repealed, again ostensibly permanently.
This situation lasted until the passage of the Revenue Act of 1971,
which reinstated the credit. Also introduced in the Revenue Act
was the "asset depreciation range" (ADR) which allowed firms to
raise or lower lifetimes used in depreciation calculations up to 20%,
for equipment.
Because of the recession experienced beginning in 1974,
stimulative measures were desired, and included in the Tax Reduction
Act of 1975 was a "temporary" increase in the maximum rate of the
tax credit from 7% to 10%. This increase has already been extended
through 1980 by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, and proposals have been
made to make it permanent.
Despite the frequent use of various investment incentives in
recent years, uncertainty remains about the best way to use such
policy tools. Indeed, it is problematic whether such. instruments
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should, be used at all. Even if they are to be used, unresolved
questions still remain, and fall into two categories: how to apply
the incentive, and when to apply it. The first type of question
is often associated with the concept known as neutrality. It is
argued that incentives should, naturally, encourage investment,
but should not bias the relative choice between investments. There
have been conflicting notions of what measures achieve neutrality,
the controversy arising in part from the imprecise nature of the
concept.
The choise of when to apply tax incentives is an extremely
difficult one. The closer the economy is to what is referred to
as "full employment,"4 the less effect an incentive will have.
When most available resources are already in use, encouraging firms
to invest more will merely lead to higher interest rates and a
"crowding out" of other, non—subsidized investment sectors such as
residential housing and, to a lesser extent, the purchase of consumer
durables such as automobiles. Thus, incentives will be most effective
when there is sufficient slackness in the economy for expansion to
occur. This leads to two problems for the policy maker. First,
lags in the institution of an e.xpansionary policy may cause the
incentive to occur at the wrong time. There is evidence that this
was often true for past incentives.5 Second, by changing the
incentive over time, the government may actually induce cycles in
investment behavior and thereby further destabilize the dynamic path
of the economy.
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We consider the above issues in the following sections of
this paper. In the next section, we discuss neutrality and related
issues. In Section III, we present dynamic simulations of a
large—scale econometric model to illustrate the effects of various
policies with respect to the investment tax credit. Section IV
contains a brief discussion of how the temporary nature of incentives
may, when perceived by investors, further complicate the problem.
We draw some conclusions in the final section.
II. Neutrality and Incentive Design6
Investment incentives are instituted when there is felt to
be insufficient investment. However, there is a general perception
that it is best not to disturb the relative incentives given to
different investments, that the expansion should be "neutral."
Because different criteria have been used to measure neutrality,
conflicting prescriptions have appeared as to which policies are
neutral. There are two particular conceptions of what constitutes
a neutral incentive, but each is subject to fundamental criticisms.
In the end, the policy maker must weigh the costs of violating the
different measures in order to come up with the system of incentives
most appropriate for a particular situation.
One of the important considerations In implementing an
expansionary policy is the effect it will have on the rate of price
inflation. As aggregate demand increases as a result of expansionary8
stimuli, different sectors must adjust to meet this demand. The
more unbalanced this increase is, the more likely are bottlenecks
and shortages to occur in strategic sectors. These dislocations
will not only hamper the expansion. They will also lead to a rise
in the prices of the scarce goods, causing an increase in the overall
rate of inflation. This point has been recognized by government:
In an effort to achieve continued progress toward full
employment, we must not create inherently unstable and
ultimately counterproductive conditions along the way.
With a high inflation rate and many uncertainties still
remaining- to hamper the economy, stimulus which aims
for a balanced composition of demand and a steadypce will provide the safest and surest path of advance.
Several authors8 have described as neutral a tax incentive scheme
which induces a proportional reduction in what is known as the
"implicit rental cost" of different types of capital goods used by
corporations. Under rather general assumptions, such a policy will
lead to a balanced expansion of corporate capital investment. Assuming
that this expansionary policy does not lead to a rise in interest
rates, this kind of neutrality may be achieved by the institution
of a uniform investment tax credit on all investment, with an
adjustment to the depreciable base, as mandated under the Long
Amendment, equal to the amount of the credit.
However, it is likely that interest rates will rise a certain
amount (see footnote 17). If they do, then neutrality in the above
sense would require the credit to be larger for longer—lived assets,
with the rate of increase being determined by the extent of the rise.
Furthermore, if, as in the U.S. there is a preexisting credit, the9
foregoing analysis applies to changes in the level of the credit,
rather than to the level itself.
Along with the desirability of a balanced expansion, economic
efficiency looms as a major consideration In incentive construction.
This concept dictates that it is generally in the public interest
that resources should be invested in those projects yielding the
greatest socialreturn.9 Were there no corporate taxes, the social
return from a project would accure entirely to the investing firm.
Thus, it would be in the best interests of each firm to choose those
projects most profitable from the social viewpoint. In a system
with corporate taxation, the private and social returns from a project
are different because part of the social return is taken by government
in the form of taxes. It is desirable that projects that are preferred
from the social point of view are also more profitable to the firm
making the investment choice. In particular, if project A has a
higher social return than project B, the prospective profitability
of A should be h igher from the firm's point of view as well.
This has been the motivation behind the second major approach
to neutrality)0 What is advocated is a tax system which
proportionally changes the private internal rate of return on different
investments. When no investment credit is present, the existence
of this condition depends on the structure of depreciation allowances.
If depreciation allowances correspond to "economic depreciation"
(see Section I), then two assets which would have the same social
rate of return were there no taxes would be of equal profitability10
in the presence of them.11 There is no evidence that the currently
used depreciation schedules bear any close resemblance to economic
depreciation. Even if the depreciation allowances were appropriate,
they are based on original cost and not replacement value. Thus,
the real value of such tax deductions declines when there is an
increase in the rate of inflation, with short—lived assets being
hit the hardest.
Because of inflation, and because depreciation allowances tend
to be more accelerated for longer lived assets even in the absence
of inflation, the tax system, without the investment tax credit,
is currently biased toward investments in more durable assets.
Given the circumstances, how should the investment tax credit be
designed? The introduction of a uniform tax credit raises the
internal rate of return on all investments. However, a uniform
credit will generally favor those investments which are less durable.
To demonstrate this, we present a simple example.
Consider a firm with two projects. In Project A, a machine
is purchased at the outset for $100, and yields a perpetual stream
of annual $10 receipts, after taxes. Project B also begins with
the purchase of a machine for $100. However, this machine lasts
only one year, yielding $110 after taxes. Of these receipts, $100
is spent on a new machine of the same type. This procedure is
repeated every year, giving an infinite stream of $10 per year,
just as in Project A. Now, suppose a 5% investment tax credit is
enacted. Since Project A entails no new purchases, its receipt
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stream is unaffected. However, since $100 is annually spent on
new machines in Project B, $5 is added to annual receipts. Whereas
A and B were previously equally profitable, B now has a higher rate
of return for the firm.
a
Ifthe existing tax system were neutral, in the present sense,
without a tax credit, the maintenance of neutrality in the presence
of a tax credit would thus call for a smaller credit for less durable
assets. In the present system, the answer is less simple. In
Table 1, we illustrate this by comparing the internal rates of return
on two different hypothetical assets, one with a service life of
ten years, one of thirty years. Each asset is assumed to provide
receipts, before taxes, which decline at a rate of l/T per year,
where T is the service life, and then drop to zero in year T.
Depreciation allowances are assumed to follow the sum—of—the—years—
digits method. We take both assets to have an internal rate of
return of l27 in the absence of all taxes.
The results confirm the argument stated above. With the
introduction of the current tax system without the investment tax
credit, the more durable asset has a higher rate of return when
inflation is zero, 7.2% versus 6.8%. With an inflation rate of 6%,
this bias is increased, with the rate of return on the thirty—year
asset being almost three times that on the ten—year asset. The
introduction of a uniform 10% credit raises the return on the shorter
lived asset substantially more. However, the total bias of the tax
system remains uncertain, and depends on the rate of inflation.TABLE I
INTERNALRATE OFRETURNFOR
TWOHYPOTHETICALASSETS
Inflation =0 Inflation= 6%
10 year 30 year 10 year 30 year
Notaxes 12.0% 12.0% 12.0% 12.0%
u =48%;k =0 •6.8 7.2 2.1 6.0
u =48%;k10% 10.1 8.5 6.0 7.4
V
1213
At a zero rate of inflation, the bias remains in favor of the more
durable asset. In this case, a neutral credit would decrease with
asset life.
Added to the limitation of the two approaches to neutrality
discussion in this section is the fact that they treat the corporate
sector in isolation. Various gross distortions exist In the tax
treatment of non—corporate investment, especially owner—occupied
housing.12 Removing biases among the choice of assets within the
corporate sector, while ignoring those between sectors, need not
even constitute a step in the right direction. Even if it does,
no one simple rule of thumb is likely to yield the best policy,
given the complexities of existing tax provisions such as a selective
tax credit, the acceleration of depreciation allowances, and the
failure to index such allowances for inflation.
III. Dynamic Simulations
This section attempts an empirical evaluation of investment
incentives—— principally the investment tax credit. The discussion
focuses on the two main rationales offered for the use of investment
incentives. We first consider the impact of the investment tax
credit on the size and composition of the capital stock. Our results
suggest that further increasing the tax credit is not likely to
significantly increase the capital stock in the long run. Rather
the primary effect of credit hikes is to alter the composition of14
the capital stock. Next, the viability of the tax creditas an
instrument of countercyclical fiscal policy is assessed. We find
that the credit is not a good stabilization tool. The long lags
between implementation and effect and the extremeresponse of the
economy to sharp changes make fine tuning impossible. Nor does it
appear that the credit has a substantial effect on output per dollar
of revenue loss.
Perhaps the principal justification given for the credit is
the need to increase the nation's productive capacity by enlarging
the capital stock. It is argued that the creditencourages investment
by reducing effective cost of capital goods. At the same time,
as emphasized in Section II, the credit alters the composition of
investment. Firms are likely to substitute favored types of capital,
for varieties not subsidized. There is evidence that the credit
has induced a significant change in American investment behavior.
In 1962, the year the credit was enacted, equipment accounted for
56% of business fixed investment. By 1976, when the credit reached
10%, the share of equipment had risen to almost 70%.
Proper evaluation of the impact of investment incentives on
capital accumulation cannot be based just on analysis of the
investment sector. While the credit raises firms' demand for
investment goods, and hence loanable funds, this need not increase
the level of investment. If the supply of loanable funds (savings)
is fixed, the quantity of investment cannot rise no matter what
happens to demand. In this case, the credit will serve only to15
raise the price of loanable funds—— the interest rate. Even when
savings are free to rise, the credit—induced increase in the demand
for investment goods will bid up interest rates. The increase in
interest rates will, by raising the cost of financing investment,
partially offset the credit's stimulus.
While it is relatively clear that the credit will spur
investment in equipment, its effect on other forms of investment
is ambiguous. The credit will bid up interest rates, raising the
cost of investment and discouraging purchase of non—favored capital
goods, principally structures. The interest rate will rise until
enough investment has been "crowded out" to restore the balance
between the supply and demand for loanable funds. On the other
hand, when there is considerable slack in the economy, the credit
may raise national product, increasing the income available to save.
Increases in GNP also raise the demand for investment goods, as firms
recognize the need to produce extra output. Thus, the key factor
affecting the relationship between the credit and other investment
is the response of loanable funds. When the supply of loanable funds
can rise, the accelerator effect of more output will increase
investment in all sectors. Otherwise the stimulus of the credit
is likely to be significantly offset by "crowding out" in non—favored
investment sectors.
Empirical evaluation of these issues requires a model of the
U.S. economy. We have employed the Data Resources Incorporated (DRI)
econometric model to "simulate" several different policy options16
for the investment tax credit. The model contains several hundred
statistically estimated equations relating important macro—economic
variables. It has been estimated using data from the period 1954—1976.
The equations have been adjusted to ensure that when historical values
of policy variables are assumed, the model traces two actual paths
of the economy very accurately. In the DRI model, as in most
econometric models, the level of each type of investment is primarily
determined by four factors: 1) the cost of capital, 2) the level of
GNP,3) theamount of capital becoming obsolete or wearing out, and
4) corporate cash flow. As the Cost of capital rises firms are
assumed to reduce investment. Increases in the credit, liberalization
of depreciation allowances, or decreases in the interest rate reduce
the cost of capital. The level of GNPentersthe equation because
the demand for investment goods is assumed to be proportional to
the output firms' produce. The amount of capital which must be
replaced is an obvious determinant of investment. Finally, the
equation recognizes that corporations are likely to invest more when
they have more funds on hand.14 The other sectors of the model embody
relatively standard assumptions. The model is in the Keynesian
tradition embodying substantial effects of both monetary and fiscal
policies. While the level of output is determined primarily by
aggregate demand, the DRI model does include a rather elaborate
treatment of aggregate supply. Unlike some other macroeconometric
models, interest rates and equity returns are explicitly modelled
as adjusting to ensure portfolio equilibrium)517
Initially we focus on evaluating the credit as an instrument
for encouraging investment in the long run. So as to emphasize the
long—run effects of the credit, three hypothetical simulationswith
a constant credit were performed. Simulations I, II and III set
the effective credit at a constant rate of 0, 5.6% and 12% respectively
for the 1964—76 period. The effective credit is less than the
statutory credit because of various provisions limitingfirms' ability
to receive the fullcredit.16 The 5.6% effective rate corresponds
to the 7% statutory rate in effect through much of the 1960s.
A 12% effective rate is equivalent to about a 13% statutory rate
under current law. In all three simulations, all other policy
variables were set at actual historical values. Thus, we evaluate
the effect of a pure change in the credit, with no accommodating
or offsetting changes in other fiscal and monetarypolicies.17
Table II presents the results of the three simulations. Levels
of output, investment and interest four, eight and twelve years after
the introduction of the credit are presented. It is easy to see
that the investment credit is expansionary. After twelve years,
investment in equipment is raised $6.2 billion by a 5.6% credit,
and $12.8 billion by a 12% credit. The increase in investment does
not, however, generate enough savings to prevent increased investment
demand from bidding up the interest rate. The 5.6% credit raises
the interest rate by about 35 basis points in the long run. A 12%
credit raises the interest rate by just over 1% within just four
years. These increases in the interest rate crowd out investmentTABLE II
LONG-RUN EFFECTS OF THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT*
1968 1972 1976
GNP
RITC=0 1051.3 1168.0 1265.9
RITC =5.67 1054.1 1174.1 1271.9
RITC =127 1059.3 1175.9 1272.9
Fixed Investment
RITC =0 149.4 177.6 158.2
RITC =5.6% 152.5 181.4 162.4
RITC =127 157.3 183.7 165.5
Equipment
RITC =0 61.9 72.7 70.7
RITC =5.67 67.8 79.0 76.9
RITC =12% 75.9 87.2 83.5
Business Structures
RITC =0 42.7 44.3 37.5
RITC =5.67 42.0 42.8 36.5
RITC =127 41.4 40.6 34.0
Residential Structures
RITC =0 43.8 59.6 48.9
RITC =5.67 41.8 58.5 48.0
RITC =127 39.1 54.8 47.0
Housing Starts
RITC =0 1.584 2.284 1.645
RITC =5.67 1.488 2.226 1.594
RITC =127 1.370 2.054 1.566
Interest Rate
RITC =0 5.85 7.15 8.01
RITC =5.67 6.23 7.49 8.33
RITC =127 6.85 8.03 8.54
*Allvariables are measured in billions of 1972 dollars,




inother sectors in the long run. For example, in 1972 a 12% credit
reduces housing starts by almost 230,000 units relative to the
no—credit case. After twelve years the 12% credit raises investment
in equipment by $12.8 billion but increases total fixed investment
by only $7.3 billion. Hence more than 40% of the stimulus to equipment
investment is offset by reductions in other investment. Rising
interest rates do not only hurt investment demand.GNP rises less
than does total investment as higher interest rates slighly reduce
consumption demand.
It is noteworthy that, as the credit increases, the extent
of the crowding out effect also rises. A 5.6% credit raises real
GNP by $6 billion after twelve years. Further increasing the credit
to 12% generates only an additional $1 billion output. Virtually
all of the extra stimulus provided by the further increase in the
credit is crowded out. It follows that increases in the credit from
the current 10% rate may not have a substantial expansionary effect.
Since structures deteriorate much less rapidly than equipment,
comparison of annual investment may give a misleading picture of
the credit's effect on the size and composition of the aggregate
capital stock.
Table III presents estimates of the change in the stock of
capital under each of the three policies discussed above. Historical
changes in capital stocks are also presented. The credit has had
a substantial effect on the stock of equipment. Had the credit never






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































about 9.5% of the current stock. However, the credit has reduced
the stock of other business and residential structures. For example,
with no credit, we would today have 600,000 more housing units.
A constant 12% credit would have eliminated another one million
housing units. While a constant 12% credit would have raised the
equipment stock by $48.5 billion above historical levels, it would
have increased the total capital stock by only $0.8 billion. Hence
about 98% of the increase in equipment. is offset by declines in
structures investment. This reflects the "increasing crowding out"
phenomenon discussed in the previous paragraph. Comparing the
no—credit and 5.6% credit cases, one does find that total capital
accumulation is increased by $20 billion by the latter option.
However, raising the credit from 5.6% to 12% actually reduces total
net capital accumulation by almost $1 billion.
While the investment tax credit may have potent short—run
effects on investment, we are skeptical of its long—run effect on
capital accumulation. The primary impact of the credit appears to
be the reallocation of investment towards equipment. Unless
policy—makers seek to shift the composition of investment towards
equipment, the credit does not seem like a useful policy instrument
for affecting long—run capital accumulation. Particularly, when
the credit is already at a high level, increases appear to have
costs in terms of reduced residential and nonresidential structures
which at least balance any benefits.22
-p
Itmay be desirable to shift the composition of investment
towards equipment. The tax system substantially favors investment
in owner—occupied housing because martgage interest is tax deductible
while imputed rental income is not taxed. This distortion may be
offset by the various other institutional interferences, most notably
Regulation Q, which pervade the mortgage mrakets. The credit was
originally limited to equipment because it was felt that structures
received much more favorable depreciation allowances. However,
policy—makers should recognize that increases in equipment do come
at a significant cost in terms of other forms of investment.
The second rationale offered for the use of the investment
tax credit is that it is an effective countercyclical policy
instrument. By raising the credit when the economy is slack, and
lowering it in boom times, policy—makers can try to stabilize the
level of investment and output. This has been the objective of the
repeated changes in the credit in 1966, 1969, 1971 and 1973 detailed
in Section I. We first examine the efficacy of these policy changes
by contrasting the historical path of the economy with the path that
the economy would have followed had the credit been kept constant
at its initial 5.6% effective rate. The results are presented in
Table IV. They suggest that the credit has actually contributed
to economic instability. In every year, the unemployment rate along
the actual path exceeds or equals the rate along the constant credit
path. Unemployment, over the entire period averages about .1% higher
than the model predicts it would have with a constant credit. OutputTABLE IV













Actual Path 874.4 5.2 4.40 124.8
Constant 5.6% 874.4 5.2 4.40 124.8
1965
Actual Path 925.9 4.5 4.49 138.8
Constant 5.6% 925.9 4.5 4.49 138.8
1966
Actual Path 981.0 3.8 5.13 144.6
Constant 5.6% 981.0 3.8 5.13 144.6
1967
Actual Path 1007.7 3.8 5.51 140.7
Constant 5.6% 1009.6 3.8 5.52 141.8
1968
Actual Path 1051.8 3.6 6.18 150.9
Constant 5.6% 1054.1 3.5 6.23 152.5
1969
Actual Path 1078.8 3.5 7.03 157.5
Constant 5.6% 1078.6 3.5 7.14 157.5
1970
Actual Path 1075.2 5.0 8.04 150.4
Constant 5.6% 1081.5 4.8 8.14 154.3
1971
Actual Path 1107.4 6.0 7.39 160.2
Constant 5.6% 1119.5 5.5 7.57 167.7
1972
Actual Path 1171.0 5.6 7.21 178.8




















































over the twelve—year period is reduced $33.1 billion by the variable
credit. Not only are output and employment lower in the variable
credit simulation, they are also more variable. The standard
deviation of unemployment in the constant credit simulation is .33%
compared to .44% in the variable credit simulation. Nor is there
any evidence that the credit stabilizes volatile investment demand.
Investment is both lower and more volatile in the "historical"
simulation than in the hypothetical constant credit simulation.
Careful examination of Table IV reveals the principal reason
for the credit's destabilizing effect—— the sharp immediate response
of the economy to policy changes. One year after the brief credit
removal of 1966, the economy is actually in worse condition, operating
at a lower level than it would have if the credit had never been
enacted. To better illustrate this point, Table V compares the path
of the economy from 1968 to 1976 with and without the 1969—1971 credit
moratorium. Three features stand out. First, the termination of
the credit exacerbated the small 1970—1971 recession. The removal
of the credit caused an additional .5% or 450,000 workers to be
unemployed in 1971 and reduced 1971's output by $11.9 billion.
Second, the restoration of the credit further fueled an overheated
economy in 1972 and 1973. The increased demand mostly led to higher
prices, as the restoration of the credit caused prices to increase
.4% faster in 1973 than they would have had the credit been maintained
at a constant level. Third, the overheating of the economy in 1972
and 1973, partially due to the credit, exacerbated the sharp 1975TABLE V




Constant Credit 1051.8 3.6 6.18 4.8
Actual 1051.8 3.6 6.18 4.8
1969
Constant Credit 1079.5 3.5 7.03 5.3
Actual 1078.8 3.5 7.03 5.3
1970
Constant Credit 1082.8 4.8 8.08 6.0
Actual 1075.2 5.0 8.04 5.9
1971
Constant Credit 1119.3 5.5 7.56 4.4
Actual 1107.4 6.0 7.39 4.3
1972
Constant Credit 1173.7 5.4 7.49 3.3
Actual 1171.0 5.6 7.21 3.3
1973
Constant Credit 1230.1 5.0 7.66 6.5
Actual 1234.8 4.9 7.44 6.1
1974
ConstantCredit 1218.6 5.6 8.58 10.6
Actual 1217.8 5.6 8.56 10.9
1975
Constant Credit 1207.6 8.3 8.74 9.0
Actual 1202.2 8.5 8.83 9.2
1976
Constant Credit 1279.7 7.5 8.40 5.7
Actual 1274.6 7.7 8.44 5.7
*In the "Constant Credit" simulation, the effective credit is
held constant at 5.6% from 1969 to 1971. In the "Actual" simulation
the credit is removed from 69:2 to 71:2 as actually took place.
In both simulations, the 1975 credit hike to 9% takes place.
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decline.Output fell in 1974 by an additional $5.4 billion because
of the 1969—1971 credit moratorium. The variable credit thus
depressedboth business cycle troughs and raised the peak during
the 1968—76 period. Ateachpoint, itactedin the wrong direction.
Poortiming of policy changes is not the sole cause of the
credit's disastrous stabilization record. Much of the problem can
be found in the lag structure of the economy's response. The credit,
when enacted, immediately spurs investment and output. But the
forces which ultimately crowd Out some of the stimulus are also
set in motion. When the credit is removed, these forces linger,
leaving the econony worse off than it would have been without the
credit, as the stimulative effects go away but the offsetting ones
remain. This phenomenon can be seen in Tables IV and V. In Table IV,
the removal of the credit in 1966 does not reduce significantly the
interest rate. En Table V, the removal of the credit in 1969 does
not lower the interest rate very much. Nor does its reimposition
raise the interest rate significantly until 1974. This pattern of
response makes successful control of the economy with the tax credit
very difficult. For within a few years after its adoption, the credit
itself generates a need for stabilization policy. Gordon and
Jorgenson (1976) use the DRI model to find the optimum timing of
credit changes. The conclude that a relatively stable policy is
superior to even an optimally chosen variable credit policy. Their
analysis assumed away any problems of lags in policy—maker recognition
or implementation. It follows a fortiori, that, in actual practice,
variable credit policies should be avoided.28
While failures in the use of other stabilization instruments
are well documented, the cause is typically poor implementation
timing. Better executive and legislative decisions might be expected
to lead to improved results. On the other hand, our results suggest
that the failure of the credit as a countercyclical instrument is
inherent in the dynamic pattern of the economy's response. This
implies that countercyclical policy will be more successful if other
instruments, such as personal tax changes and monetary policy, are
relied on, rather than alteration of investment incentives.
The credit is often advocated on the grounds that it provides
more "bang for the buck" than alternative tax incentive measures.
More generally, the revenue cost of the credit is of obvious concern
to policy—makers contemplating its use. Most estimates of the revenue
cost of alternative credit policies, notably those found in the
Concurrent Budget Resolution of the Congress make a fundamental error.
These estimates are made on the assumption that the credit has no
effect on output. They thus greatly overestimate its initial cost,
by neglecting the increased revenues from other taxes following an
increase in GNP. Calculations of revenue loss also frequently make
the error of comparing only short—run revenue and investment impacts
of the credit. Clearly the credit has substantial effects for several
years, even after it has been removed. These effects should also
be considered in assessing its true cost.
In order to measure the true revenue cost over the long run
of the credit, we simulated the model starting in 1964 with a 5.6%29
effective credit. The credit was removed permanently in the fourth
quarter of 1966. Table VI presents estimates of the total revenue
cost of the investment credit discounted at 5% and 10% rates. Both
direct and net costs are calculated. Although the stimulusprovided
by the credit raises tax revenues initially, the direct cost is less
the net cost because of the sharp downturn caused by the credit's
removal. Table VI also contains impacts of the credit on total
output, and investment. Per dollar of net revenue loss, the investment
tax credit only raises output by between $0.51 and $0.85,depending
on the discount rate. The impact on Investment is even smaller,
totally between $0.38 and $0.59. It is difficult to find a standard
with which to compare these estimates. However, most modelsestimzte
that a reduction of $1 in taxes will raiseoutput by close to $2
over a several—year period.18 It seems unlikely, therefore, that
the credit is a particularly potent form of economic incentive.
This conclusion is strengthened by the results In Tables IIand II
suggesting that increases in the credit above current levels would
be even less powerful.
On balance, our examination of the empirical evidence leads
us to conclude that the investment tax credit has had and continues
to have an undesirable effect on the economy. Theprimary long—run
effect of the credit is to reallocate capital fromstructures to
equipment. The housing sector bears much of the burden of credit
increases. Raising the credit from 10% to 12%as has been widely
discussed would eliminate about 100,000housing units by 1980.TABLE VI
REVENUECOSTSVS. BENEFITSOF ThE
INVESTNENT TAXCREDIT*
Direct CostDeficit GNP t Investment
0%discount 8.2 11.7 6.0 3.1
5%discount 7.8 9.9 6.7 4.2
10%discount 7.4 8.5 7.1 5.0
*
Basedon comparison over 12—year period 1964—1976 of a 5.6%
credit through 66:4, with no credit. All figures are in real terms.
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Short—run variations in the credit have been uniformly counterproduc-
tive since its inception. The prolonged and uneven response of the
economy to changes in the credit make it unlikely that even the most
carefully planned future variations will have better results.
Finally, we find no evidence that the credit is a particularly useful
instrument for maximizing economic stimulus per dollar of revenue
loss. None of these considerations justify the credit's immediate
removal. However, they do imply that further increases are almost
certainly unwarranted, that temporary changes will be destabilizing,
and that gradual removal would probably be desirable.
These conclusions can have no more validity than the model
which generated them. We recognize that this factor implies that
our results are somewhat tentative. While the DRI model is not
perfect for answering the questions this paper addresses, it seems
as suitable as any current alternative. Reliance on an imperfect
model strikes us as preferable to the partial equilibrium, single—
equation techniques used in most previous evaluations of investment
incentives..
IV. The Effect of Temporary Incentives
The results of the previous section indicate that countercyclical
use of the investment tax credit Is ill—advised, because of the time
lags in the effect of such policies. A brief consideration of the
effect of temporary policies on anticipations by firms strengthens
the argument.
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The assumption implicit in our analysis so far, and in all
previous estimates of the effect of investment incentives, is that
firms take the current tax law to be permanent; that is, no changes
are anticipated. While this maybevalid when considering "once
and for all" changes in the tax code, it is hardly so for policies
which are, by their design, intended not to be permanent. It is
more appropriate to assume that, if it isgovernment's avowed purpose
to use the investment tax credit as a countercyclical tool, firms
will take this into account in their investment plans. Such
anticipations may have strong and perverse results. In particular,
firms will attempt to concentrate their investment spending in periods
during which the credit applies. Thus, a mild recession may be
exacerbated by firms delaying investment in anticipation of a credit
increase. Symmetrically, an inflationary boom may be fueled by firms
trying to squeeze in additional investment before the credit is
removed.
Not only will a flexible credit affect the timing of investment,
but also the distribution among assets of different durability.
The longer the service life of an asset, the more difference it makes
in firm profits over time whether a credit may be applied to the
asset's purchase. Thus, the bunching of investment spending during
the existence of a credit will be more pronounced for more durable
assets.
The power of the anticipations effect may be emphasized by a
simply numerical example. Suppose there is no tax credit presently33
in effect, and that a firm must make a decision as to the timing
of a $100 machine purchase. Suppose also that, in the absence of
any change in the tax law, the firm would be indifferent between
investing now or waiting one year. Now, imagine that, because of
a government policy, explicitly stated or not, to use the tax credit
as a stabilization tool, the investment planner expects the institution
next year of a 10% tax credit. Then, by waiting one year to invest,
the firm may expect to gain 10% on the machine investment. If the
rate of return on the investment is also 10%, then the firm can
double its first—year profit on the investment by waiting one year,
if its anticipation is correct. It is plausible to speculate that
expected increases in the credit may be related to current investment
shortfalls.
In sum, the already negative aspects of the investment tax
credit as a stabilization tool are augmented by the fact that, when
anticipated, it will perversely influence the timing of investment,
and destabilize the mix between different types of investment over
the cycle. The explicit announcement of future policy changes, as
has been recommended in the proposal of a flexible tax credit,'9
can only exacerbate this problem by making anticipations more certain.34
-p
V.Conclusions
There is little evidence that a change in the investment tax
credit is an effective tool for exapansionary fiscal policy. We
find that it has tended to destabilize the dynamic behavior of the
economy, and that the "bang per buck" of incentive stimulus is much
smaller than has been assumed. The "crowding Out" of non—favored
investment has been sufficiently important to offset a large
percentage of the increase in the stock of equipment resulting from
the use of the credit. Because investment may be postponed or speeded
up, anticipations of policy changes with respect to the tax treatment
of investment may greatly exacerbate the destabilizing impact of
such changes. While we have focused our attention on the investment
tax credit, these conclusions may be applied also to other types
of investment incentive such as the acceleration of depreciation
allowances. There is no reason to believe that these other investment
incentives are superior in any way to the investment tax credit.
To the extent that government deems investment incentives a
viable policy instrument, considerations of economic efficiency and
the desire for a balanced expansion must be taken into account.
Given th.e distortions in the current tax structure, no simple rule
of thumb is likely to dictate the best incentive structure. Of utmost
importance is that the impact of incentives to corporate investment
on investment in the rest of the economy should be recognized.35
Appendix
In this appendix, we demonstrate a number of the propositions
stated in Sections I and II of the paper. The discussion presumes
a familiarity with the neoclassical investment model used in Hall
and Jorgenson (1971).
Let T be the corporate tax rate and k the investment tax credit.
Without any loss of generality, we consider the case in which the
credit is accompanied by an appropriate basis adjustment, as was
the case under the Long Amendment (see text). The firm's debt—equity
ratio is b/(l—b). The nominal rate of return to equity—holders
is p, and the nominal rate of interest is 1. Since they do not
influence the outcome of any of the effects studied below, we ignore
personal income taxes. As shown in Auerbach (i979b), a wealth
maximizingfirm with debt and equity will strive to maximize the
present value ofthe net revenues that would occur if itwere entirely
equity—financed,using as its nominal discount rate
r bi(l—T) + (l—b)p . (Al)
We assume that capital decays exponentially at rate 6, and
that prices inflate at rate Yr.It then follows that firms invest
in capital as long as the marginal product of capital exceeds the
"user cost" or implicit rental rate:
c =q(r—Tr+tS)(1— Tz)(l—k)/(1— t) (A2)36
where q is the price ratio between capital goods and output, z is
the present value of depreciation deductions, D(t), allowed for a
unit of capital purchased for one dollar.
z jet D(t)dt . (A3)
At every point in time after its purchase, capital decays at
rate 5. Thus, the physical decay at time t is the decay rate times
the capital remaining, óet. For a unit of capital which originally
cost one dollar, replacement cost is at time t. Thus, the value
of z for economic depreciation is:
ZE
=jet6etetdt =6/(r—+). (A4)
If z > ZE depreciation is said to be accelerated.





Clearly, if z =ZEan increase in t must increase the user cost,
and will do so more the less levered the firm is. However, if
z > ZE this need not be so. As an extreme case, suppose immediate
expensing is permitted, so that z =1.Then (A5) reduces to:
c=q(l—k)[bi(1—t) + (l—b)p —iT+ 6] (A6)37
Unlessthe firm has no debt, its user cost will increase with a
reduction in T,therebydiscouraging investment.
It is evident that, were r fixed, a proportional reduction
in c for different assets would be provided by a proportional decline
in (1—k). Thus, if the existing credit applicable for different
assets were the same, a uniform increase in k would be called for.
However, suppose a one percent reduction in c for all types of
capital led to anpercent rise in the real cost of capital, r—ir.
Then, as shown in Auerbach (1978 ), the appropriate change in k for
each asset is:
—11—k)r1 n(r—1r) A7 -
dc IcJL(r-7r)+(l-r)6
Thus, the smaller the value of 6, i.e., the more durable the asset,
the larger the increase in k would be required for an equiproportional
decrease in c.
Now, suppose that k =0.Let be the real marginal product
of capital, which has relative price q. In the absence of corporate




With taxes anddepreciationdeductions, the real internal rate of
return, x'satisfies:





Note first that if depreciation allowances follow economic
depreciation, then D(t) =6ete'TTt,so that z' =6/(x'+rS)and
x =(1—T)x, so that the reduction in the internal rate of return
is independent of 5.
If depreciation allowances are not indexed, but otherwise follow
true depreciation, then D(t) =5et,and (AlO) becomes:
x' =(l—T)xrTr6/(x'+7r+c5) (A12)
For positive rates of inflation, x' <(l—T)x,so that we may think
of the failure to index depreciation allowances as an additional
tax on corporate income. Further, it is easy to verify that, for
given x, <0,so that the magnitude of this extra tax increases39
with 6, i.e., decreases with asset life. •As stated in the text,
short—lived assets are the hardest hit. This is because depreciation
allowances represent a greater proportion of the total return from
short—lived assets.40
Footnotes
1. In 1976, gross private domestic investment, excluding residen-
tial investment, was $115.7 billion in 1972 dollars. Gross national
product was $1,265.0 billion.
2. For the period from 1948 to mid—1977, investment averaged 14%
of GNP. However, absolute quarter—to—quarter changes in investment were,
on average, 28% of absolute changes in GNP. Thus, investment has con-
tributed more to the volatility of GNP than its share alone would indicate.
3. See the appendix for further discussion.
4. There will always exist some unemployment in the economy because
of sectoral shifts in the demand and supply of labor. The unemployment
rate at which only this "frictional" unemployment in present has been
estimated to lie between 4% and 6%.
5. See Gordon and Jorgenson (1976).
6. A mathematical treatment of the material in this section is
presented in the appendix.
7. Economic Report of the President, 1977, pp. 29—30.
8. Including White and White (1972), Sunley (1973) and Sandmo (1974).
9. There are important limitations to this approach, relating to
the fact that different types of assets yield different service patterns
over their productive lives. An analysis of this problem is beyond the
scope of this paper, and may be found in Auerbach (1978 ).
10.See Musgrave (1959), Tideman (1975) and Sunley (1976).41
11. This special characteristic of economic depreciation was
explored first by Samue1on (1964).
12. See Laidler (1969).
13. This exposition has relied on the "loanable funds" approach
to interest rate determination. Equivalent conclusions could be
reached within a "liquidity preference" framework. The formal identity
of the two approaches has long been recognized.
14. For a discussion of alternative approaches to the econometric
explanation of investment, see Bisehoff (1971). The basis of the
DRI equation is the neoclassical theory of investment described in
Hall and Jorgenson (1971). However, the equation does include a
cash flow variable, which was omitted in the original Hall—Jorgenson
specification.
15. A full discussion of the properties of the DRI model, as
well as its construction, may be found in Eckstein, Green, and Sinai
(1974).
16. The most important of these are: 1) the credit applies
fully only to assets with a greater than seven—year life; 2) until
1975, utilities did not receive the full credit; 3) credits are limited
to 50% of the taxes firms pay, although limited carryovers are
permitted.
17. It might be argued that it would be more reasonable to
assume that the Fed accommodates changed in investment incentives,
by increasing the money supply so as to keep interest rates constant.
Such an assumption appears inconsistent with historical evidence.42
Feldstein and Summers (1978) estimate that increases in investment
incentives do have a significant impact on interest rates. Our
assumption of constant monetary policy is traditional in analyses
of fiscal policy effects.
18. A good general discussion of the effects of fiscal policy
changes can be found in Blinder and Solow (1974).
19. See Gordon and Jorgenson (1976) for references on this
subject.43
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